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Abstract
The links among strategic groups based on asset configurations, cognitive communities
based on shared beliefs, and networks of cooperation and competition among nvals have exammed
in a series of empirical studies. A considerable amount of overlap was found among the constructs
within the Scottish knitwear and UK grocery retailing industries. These findings could not be
replicated in the US computer software development industry. While there are a number of
plausible explanations for the differences in findings, the deviations may be a function of the rate
of change and the ambiguity associated with the structure of the industry. A cycle of reciprocal
causation proposed. Economic factors (industry structure) influence psychological factors (the
perceptions of economic incentives). Related cognitive processes within individuals drive
organizational processes among individuals (group decision-making within top management teams)
which drive organizational processes among firms (the social enactment of markets). The causal
chain comes full circle as this social enactment process influences economic factors (industry
structure). Some slippage may be induced in these causal links due to uncertainty and ambiguity
arising from (a) imperfect information regarding the economic forces currently operating in a
particular niche, and (b) an inability to forecast the the future structure of the industry due to the
threat of technological or regulatory changes. This may hinder the movements of markets towards
optimal solutions. Amending Adam Smith's metaphor, "the invisible hand" tends to waiver in
ambiguous markets. Hence, as ambiguity increases, cognitive and socio-political processes will
have a greater influence on (a) decision-making within the firm, (b) patterns of cooperation and
competition among firms, and ultimately (c) industry dynamics.

Theoretical and Empirical Links Between Strategic Groups,
Cognitive Communities, and Networks of Interacting Firms
Phenomena studied in strategic management research often can be viewed through more
than one lens. Some of the more widely drawn upon perspectives include industrial/organizational
economics, OB, and psychology. Generally, each perspective can capture a part of a given
strategic management phenomena, but like the parable of three blind men feeling an elephant, an
integrated understanding is rarely obtained. Despite the potential benefits of an integrative
perspective, there has been little progress in synthesizing the various theories. The primary
difficulties stem from incompatible assumptions, differences in units of analysis, etc.
Assuming that an integrative approach is not possible, there have been calls for a multilectic
approach in which a (partially) incommensurate theoretical perspectives are juxtaposed. Huff
(1981, p. 87) argues that "the culture clash between genuinely different points o^ view can be an
important basis for the development of knowledge." Such clashes can stimulate creative thinking.
This may lead to the extension of existing theones or the development new ones.
In addition to eclectic theoretical efforts, empincal research may be used to support or reject
theoretical overlaps. The collection of new data may facilitate inductive reasoning that may help
extend and integrate existing theories or develop new ones. Unfortunately, many empincists avoid
multimethod research because it requires more effort. Also, discrepancies across methods often
arise. Many analysts wrestle endlessly with such discrepancies under the assumption that failing to
find perfect convergence indicates a flaw in the design or an error in the analyses.
While it is often desirable to observe similarities across methods (e.g., to empirically
support theoretical relationships), it might also be useful to emphasize the dissimilarities across
methods to underscore the need for multimethod research. Rather than framing the discrepancies
as "noise" or "errors," it might be fruitful to frame the discrepancies as diagnostic information that
could further efforts to integrate the vanous perspectives. This essentially reverses what is often
considered as the foreground and the background. Such discrepancies may be the most
informative data of all. For example, they may point to factors that sway cognitive and
organizational processes away from economic rationality.
Of course there are many other possible causes for such discrepancies, and strategy
researchers will have to be clever to tease out these factors. As economists often suggest, "If it
was an easy problem to solve, someone would have done it already." Yet strategy researchers
should not shy away from such problems.
Researchers in neighboring fields like economics, OB, and psychology generally must
focus their efforts within their respective fields. Evaluations for tenure and pay within a given
department tend to be influenced more by publications within journals recognized as relevant by
members of that department. In a publish or parish environment, this often forces researchers into
a relatively focussed strategy for research. That is, given a lack of incentives for interdisciplinary
research in those fields, researchers may be less inclined to expend their resources (e.g., time,
effort) to gain exposure to, and publish, in other streams of literature.
In contrast, strategic management is the field that claims to integrate these and other streams
of research. Presumably, this is the value added by strategic management. By the vary nature of
the field, researchers in strategic management are simultaneously exposed to a variety of theoretical
perspectives on a daily basis. This constant exposure should pnme the pump for multilectic (if not
truly integrative) thinking. This is a potential source of comp>etitive advantage for strategic
management vis-a-vis other fields.
Unfortunately, strategic management is often viewed as an applied area that simply imports
theories from a variety of more theoretically oriented fields. For example, the relationship between
strategy and economics has been compared to the relationship between engineenng and physics.
While practitioners may benefit from such an orientation, there is very little value added for
researchers if a multilectic approach merely applies several perspectives without building on the
insights gained from juxtaposing them. This may do a serious disservice to the field by ignoring
the opportunity for interdisciplinary theory development.
Perhaps another metaphor could be found that would suggest the potential value added by
strategic management research. Economics could be likened to Newtonian physics in that it studies
certain forces impinging on an object (e.g., an organization, and industry). OB/OT could be
likened to chemical engineering in that it focuses on the properties of the objects or the medium
being acted upon (e.g., an organization, and industry) and often endeavors to redesign or create
novel forms with more desirable properties. Strategic management could be likened to fluid
dynamics: the medium and the forces acting upon/within it are inherently intertwined and cannot be
meaningfully separated. This alludes to the inseparability of the content and process sides of
strategic management (e.g., formulation and implementation).
So, while economic incentives may be the best single predictor of business transactions,
people are negotiating the deals and making the decisions. While the conduct within a market may
be drawn toward economic rationality, cognitive and social forces may produce friction inhibiting
the move toward economically rational patterns. These forces may even dnve the patterns in
economically irrational directions. Metaphoncally, an organization or institutions (e.g., an
industry) is like a viscous medium that generally flows in a predictable direction (i.e., toward
economical rationality), but due to the nature of the medium, it is predisposed to the formation of
eddies and backwashes which temporarily impede and even reverse this ilow in some niches.
In this paper, an attempt is made to merge three streams of research that flow into strategic
management: industrial/organizational economics, OB, and psychology. The formation of
collectives within industries is viewed from each of these perspectives. After defining the
theoretical constructs associated with each perspective, the relationships between the constructs are
discussed. Empirical studies in three industnes are used to test the relationships among these
constructs. Findings vary systematically across industries. A theoretical framework is proposed
to explain these discrepancies and to integrate the three theoretical perspectives. Finally, two
cognitive models are developed to test hypotheses regarding the strategic action of firms, networks
of interactions among firms, and industry dynamics.
Collectives from Different Perspectives
One approach to merging different theoretical perspectives is to compare analogous
constructs from those perspectives. For example, collectives within industries have been exammed
using theories from psychology, industrial/organizational (I/O) economics, and organizational
behavior (OB). Three analogous theoretical constructs are associated with these perspectives:
cognitive communities, strategic groups, and networks of interactmg firms (respectively). In this
section, definitions of these constructs will be proposed, and the theoretical overlap among these
constructs will be discussed.
Cognitive Communities
Managers are influenced by economic incentives, but only indirectly through their
perceptions of those incentives. Managers are operating under bounded rationality. If a manager
does not perceive an economic incentive, that incentive will have no influence on the manager's
choices regarding either internal actions or transactions with other firms.
Managers are motivated to make accurate assessments of opportunities and threats in the
environment as well as strengths and weaknesses of the firm. In this sense-making process,
cognitive structures such as taxonomies of firms and causal maps are used to link strategic actions
to performance. In this way, managers are drawn toward economically rational decisions, but
imperfectly so. The situation is complicated still further in that no manager is in this alone. Each
individual is surrounded by others who are equally unable to flawlessly perceive "economic
reality" (although some of them would not admit it, not even to themselves).
The relative profitability of various patterns of interactions are learned (a) directly through
trial and error, (b) vicariously through observation, and (c) learning through instruction via word
of mouth, trade publications, industry observers, etc. Applying a population ecology view of the
survival a dispersion of ideas throughout the niche, beliefs that approximate the economic reality of
the industry will survive longer and disperse more widely than less accurate beliefs. Ultimately,
the less accurate beliefs will be forced out as the more accurate beliefs diffuse among actors and
become widely shared. ^
Cognitive maps are essentially informal theories; those that best explain this data are
retained, while those that have accumulated a large number of anomalous observations are
discarded (Kuhn, 1962). This process results in a socially constructed understanding of what
works given the way that the industry is structured. Those sharing the resultmg set of beliefs
constitute a cognitive community (Porac and Thomas, 1990; Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller,
1989). The consensual set of beliefs make up the norms or recipes for doing business in an
mdustry (Spender, 1990).
Two definitions of cognitive communities are proposed. The weak definition is based
solely on similarity of cognitive structures (e.g., taxonomies of rivals, causal map); the strong
definition additionally requires active interactions, mutual intluence, and collective cognitive
efforts.
Individuals that have similar beliefs about a given transaction will be more likely to interact
than those with dissimilar beliefs. Hence, similarity of beliefs increases the likelihood of
transactions. On the other hand, as firms interact, they may mutually inlluence each other through
the diffusion of information and shared learning through direct experience. Hence, interactions
increase the likelihood of shared beliefs.
Under the strong definition, it is conceivable that the cognitive community could
collectively extend the boundaries of rationality by pooling existing information and cognitive
resources. The Japanese approach to developing a fifth generation computer illustrates the
jxDtential power that collective action can have in solving complex problems.
Rather than directing the pooled efforts toward a particular technological challenge,
members of a cognitive community may direct their efforts toward solving specific strategic
management issues and finding optimal patterns of transactions. For example, members of a
^Escalating commiunent and other psychological factors may motivate some managers to push ideas in spite of
failures (at least temporarily).
cognitive community might jointly identify a cooperative pattern of interactions that yields
satisfactory profits for all its members without a negative impact on social welfare. Identifying
such win-win solutions is often quite difficult. Intuitively, such solutions might be easier to
identify if the parties pooled their resources rather than separately trying to identify a solution that
the other members would accept. Some problems require a coordinated effort to get a solution.
Cognitive commumties reflect a predominantly psychological view of large collectives
within industries. If a economic orientation is adopted, the focus would not be on cognitive
communities. Strategic groups might be a more appropnate way to frame certain issues of
collectives within industries.
Strategic Groups
As noted in the discussion of cognitive communities, firms observe their competitors to
gain information about what works in the environment (Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller, 1989).
If one firm finds positions itself in an extraordinarily profitable niche, some of its competitors will
be tempted to follow it (Scherer, 1980; Tirole, 1988). As a result of this process, firms are
expected to converge on the strategic positions that yield the highest levels of performance.
As new firms enter a niche, demand is divided among more competitors. Hence incumbent
firms experience a decline in their respective market shares, and subsequent entrants tend to gain
smaller portions of the market (Scherer, 1980; Tirole, 1988). "This process should continue until
the opportunities for making a supranormal profit have been exhausted" (Scherer, 1980). Mobility
barriers (Caves and Porter, 1977; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1987; Tirole, 1988; Caves and
Ghemawat, 1989) and uncertain imitability (Lippman and Rumelt,1982) lowers the economic
incentives for potential entrants and helps to preserve economic incentives for incumbents.
Firms seek the most profitable niches that they can successfully defend. The firms with the
best fit to environmental demands get the lion's share of the profits. The weaker firms (i.e., those
ill-fitted to the environment) are left to scramble for footholds in the less attractive niches. This
process tends to bunch firms together in a number of profitable niches identified in the industry.
8These naturally occurring bundles of firms have been labeled strategic groups (Porter, 1980;
McGee and Thomas, 1986).
Explicit in the structure-conduct-performance paradigm is that firms in the same niche will
follow the same strategy because they are influenced by the same forces. That is, given a change
in industry structure, all firms should take the same action. This is assumed to be true even if each
firm is acting independently: collusion is not necessary for firms to act in parallel.
This economic view focuses on the environment outside of the firm. A resource-based
view of the firm is more inward looking. Strategic groups are clusters of firms with similar
strategic positions. Firms may have different asset bases and still hold the same strategic position
depending on the way that the assets are configured. While the focus of the economics approach
differs from that of the resource-based view, the implications are the same. Firms within strategic
groups are expected to behave in similar ways. A weak definition of strategic groups could be
based on similarity of asset configurations either as a means of operational izing firms within
similar niches or firms with similar resources.
While the concept of strategic groups has a strong I/O economics onentation, it has been
extended to more eclectic view of the phenomenon. Implicit in the term "strategic group" is that the
firms in a given group are pursuing a common strategy. That is, they have similar goals and
beliefs about how to obtain those goals. Taking a cognitive/decision-making onentation, a semi-
strong definition of strategic groups adds the constraint of similanty of cognitive structures.
A strong definition of strategic groups could be based on the interdependence of firms
within a given niche. Firms sharing a common niche may have contlicts with respect to inputs
(e.g., transactions with suppliers), throughputs (e.g., labor, equipment), and/or outputs (e.g.,
distribution channels, direct transactions with consumers). The actions of Firm A could affect the
profitability of Firm B, and vice versa. This interdependence can be viewed as a mixed motive
game.
Porter ( 1980) suggests that this interdependence is the essence of oligopoly. Multipoint,
cut-throat competition would tend to reduce profits of all the firms in this niche, while cooperative
(collusive) behavior would allow firms to take greater profits (with monopoly rents as an
upperbound) (Scherer, 1980). Typically, a mixture of cooperation and competition evolves.
However, as interdependence becomes more defused (e.g., firms can not effectively punish
specific rivals), the degree of competition will tend to increase.
Cooperation may be relatively passive. For instance, firms may simply agree not to
compete on a particular strategic dimension such as price or quantity of output. A more active
form of cooperation might involve collective strategies involving coordinated, joint actions.
Cooperation may be aimed at achieving a common goal (e.g., finding a cure of AIDS).
Alternatively, actions could be directed toward firms outside of the group. Such actions could be
offensive (e.g., collective advertising to increase joint market share relative to the rest of the
industry) or defensive (e.g., erecting mobility barriers).
While firms within the group may have to compromise with other members of the group
when forming a collective strategy, the process may broaden their options overall. By
supplementing and/or complimenting each others assets, a collective may compete in ways that
none of its member firms could (Penrose, 1959). This may include attempts to manipulate (enact)
industry structure.
From a strategic management point of view, this joint action is perhaps the most intriguing
aspect of strategic-groups. The weak and semi-strong definitions of strategic groups suggest that
firms within groups will have parallel reactions to environmental change. This helps to simplify
industry analyses for strategic planning purposes (Porter, 1980). In contrast, the strong definition
of strategic groups as networks of interacting firms enriches industry analyses by considering more
sophisticated forms of strategic behavior such as collective strategy (Astley, 1984; Bresser and
Harl, 1986; Nielsen, 1988). It is unfortunate that such networks of interactions are generally
ignored when operationalizing the strategic group construct.
The need to address coordinated efforts among individuals is apparent in both the strong
definitions of strategic groups and cognitive communities. Therefore, we turn to issues addressed
by social psychology, sociology, OB, and the like.
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Networks of Interactions Within and Among Firms
An open systems perspective is used to examine networks of interactions withm and among
firms. Firms are relatively formal systems of interacting individuals. They represent hierarchical
nexuses of relatively long-term contracts (Eisenhardt, 1985). The hierarchical nesting can be
extended as firms are embedded in larger systems such as industries (Jemison, 1981; Fombrun,
1986). In addition to being hierarchically nested, these networks of individuals may be partially
overlapping within and across levels of the hierarchy. For example, individuals may interact
within networks constituting (a) firms, (b) professional interest groups, (c) unions, (d) families,
etc. These networks may overlap any number of times and the nature of relationships between any
two individuals may be extremely complex.
As each individual may belong to a unique set of networks, each individual can be viewed
as an agent that must answer to a unique set of principals. Each individual has a personal agenda
integrating the contingencies imposed by the vanous pnncipals. Hence, it may be quite useful to
decompose the network of interactions between organizations into embedded networks of
interactions of individuals within and between those organizations.
The concept of a firm represents a cognitive (and legal) simplification that facilitates
perceptions of whom is doing what (March and Simon, 1958). While it is often expedient to talk
about a "firm's response" to events in its environment, focusing on the firm may oversimplify
certain problems.
Consider March and Simon's (1958) argument that a price mechanism and profit
maximization goals for the separate parts of a production process could be used to predict firm
behavior. These predictions should parallel those made when examining the firm as a whole. That
is, macro level maximization follows (more or less) from micro level maximization if the en tenon
used at the micro level are appropnate. This is the notion of the invisible hand. Under these
conditions it is not necessary to analyze the component parts of the firm; the solution set obtained
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by decomposing the firm into individuals and that obtained by considering the firm as a whole are
isomorphic.
However, if (a) the profit maximizing goal is replaced with a satisficing goal and
(b) pricing mechanisms are based on imperfect factor markets, it is not certain that the behavior of
individuals and coalitions will result in optimal patterns of behavior for the firm or for social
welfare. The invisible hand might waiver. Therefore, to predict the interactions among firms, it
may be necessary to consider each firm as a network of individuals and examine the intersections
of those networks.
While predictions based on individual level and firm level analyses my differ under certain
conditions, the processes involved at each level may be quite similar. March and Simon ( 1958, p.
131) state.
Many of the phenomena of intergroup conflict within organizations are
almost indistinguishable from the phenomena that we might consider under the
present heading [interorganizational conllict]. The distinction between internal and
external relations for an organization is frequently a cloudy one.
In a similar vain, Hennart (1990) argues that the distinction between processes within firms
and markets is a matter of degree. Firms emphasize behavioral controls; markets emphasize price
controls. There are few pure forms. By far, the majority of institutions have a mix of behavioral
and price controls. Models that take both forms of control into account should be able to smooth
the transition from predictions within firms to those between firms. The underlying processes do
not change.
Networks within firms. Williamson (1975) proposes that individuals cooperate to form
peer groups or hierarchies in order to mitigate the impact of bounded rationality and to reduce their
transactions costs. More generally, individuals enter into groups and organizations to obtain
personal benefits that they could not readily obtain on their own (Penrose, 1959; March & Simon,
1958; Axelrod, 1984).
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Networks often form serendipitously as transactions among participants evolve over time
as parties try muddling through. There need not be a consensually held ideal or common goal. On
the other hand, networks could be developed intentionally. To enact a vision of a market, an
entrepreneur could identify potential participants and convince a sufficient number of them that the
interactions would be profitable with an acceptable level of risk. While the most widely accepted
motivation involves economic incentives, there may be a broad range of reasons for participating m
transactions (e.g., personal interests, chantable/ethical considerations, image). A shrewd
entrepreneur will often emphasize the idiosyncratic set of non-economic incentives that are salient
for a given participant, and use these as bargaining chips to reduce the level of economic incentives
necessary to induce participation.
Routines (and the complex social systems they are embedded in) can vary in cost. The
most efficient routines are self-reinforcing and , therefore, self- perpetuating. To sustain less
efficient routines, the firm might have to pump in resources to reward past participation and
maintain a satisfactory expected utility for future participation.
According to March and Simon ( 1958), the survival of the firm depends on how much it
costs to run the routines relative to the pnce that the consumer is willing to pay for the product or
service. If the pnce is at least as great as the cost, then the participants can receive the expected
level of rents. The routines will continue to fire as expected until the perceptions of the payoffs
change. If the expected utility of performing a part of the routine drops below aspiration levels,
and/or a superior alternative is perceived (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), any given member might
withdraw resources from the routine.
This has implications for all others associated with the routine. Coworkers who depend on
that routine will receive personal rents below their aspirations. They might capitalize on resource
dependencies to pressure the shirking member to cooperate. Alternatively, coworkers might decide
to shirk as well. If this degenerative process continues, members of the firm will search for
alternatives in other firms. Eventually, The firm will fail, or more descnptively, it will dissolve
(Hirschman, 1970).
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Networks between firms. The same logic applies to networks between firms. Managers
exercise their authority as agents to search for networks among firms m the value chain. Managers
will choose interactions that offer them at least satisfactory personal rents; notably, this may not
optimize the rents for the firm as a whole (Levinthal, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency problems
are clearly an issue here.
As managers negotiate and renegotiate the terms of interactions, subsets of managers
(representing firms) reach equilibrium points such that the terms of interactions will not change
significantly as a result of further interactions and/or renegotiations. If the equilibrium reached in a
given network is not satisfying for all of the participants (i.e., firms represented by managers),
some participants may choose to withdraw and seek transactions in another network (Hirschman,
1970). The withdrawal of these participants may cause gaps in the value chain. If these gaps can
not be filled, the entire network may dissolve.
Some networks that are satisfying for all of its participants will eventually form. Actors
within these networks will tend to stay within the network. Further, they will often work to
preserve it (e.g., offer additional economic incentives to retain critical members), thereby
preserving their own source of rents. While an equilibrium may exist within the network,
disequilibrium may exist between networks and within the industry as a whole. Therefore, the
term bounded equilibrium will be used to descnbe the stable state of such networks. Barring
disturbances from other intersecting networks (either inside or outside of a given firm), there will
be little motivation for managers to search for alternative transactions as the managers are assumed
to satisfice.
Stable networks are functional in that they can enable collectives (e.g., strategic groups,
cognitive communities) to achieve goals that could not be achieved by the participants separately.
Yet there may be an optimal level of robustness in such bounded equilibria beyond which the
network becomes insensitive to environmental signals for change.
The view of business as an n-way exchange of fluid, hierarchical collectives is consistent
with phenomena such as joint ventures, equity sharing, mergers, etc. (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976;
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Harrigan, 1988; Lyies, 1988). Cartels form to limit competition or fix prices. OPEC exemplifies
the power that such alliances can generate. The free trade agreements between the US and Canada
as well as the plans for economic unification in the European Economic Community in 1992
illustrate this process extending beyond the boundaries of a single industry.
Overlapping Constructs
A Venn diagram illustrates the overlap in the definitions of cognitive communities, strategic
groups, and networks of interdependent firms (See Figure 1). The three criteria used in definitions
are (a) similar cognitive structures, (b) similar assets and positioning, and (c) interdependence and
interaction.
The definition of networks is the easiest to illustrate at this point, as there is only one
version of it and only one entenon—interactions among interdependent firms. Firms falling into
sections A, C, D, and G would satisfy that criterion. While a time dimension is not included in
this illustration, it may be useful to add a time based constraint for research purposes to avoid the
noise of transient relationships. That is, analyses could be confined to networks that obtain a
reasonably robust bounded equilibrium. Of course, what constitutes "reasonably robust" is
inherently a judgement call, and should be determined by the specific needs of the study.
For cognitive communities, two definitions have been proposed. The weak definition only
requires managers of firms to have similar cognitive structures. This definition encompasses
sections A, B, D, and E. In addition to this similarity, the strong definition requires that the
members of the cognitive community interact cognitively. This emphasizes the social aspect of
social cognition research in psychology. The intersection of the two criteria covers sections A and
D.
N For strategic groups, the weak definition merely requires similar asset configurations
(sections A, B, C, and F). The semi-strong definition adds the constraint of similarity of cognitive
structures. The intersection includes sections A and B. The strong definition of strategic groups
further stipulates that the firms must interact. Only firms in section A would fit that definition.
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Note that the degree of overlap among these constructs is highest when using the strong
definitions and lowest when using the weak definitions. For instance, the set of firms fitting the
strong definition of a strategic group would be a subset of those fitting the strong definition of a
cognitive community. Sets covered by weaker definitions have larger subsets of nonintersecting
firms.
There are at least two meaningful ways to use the definitions of these constructs.
Researchers could select a definition (weak, semi-strong, or strong) that is appropriate for a given
research question, and then use that definition to select a sample of firms for a study.
Alternatively, researchers could start with a particular sample of firms (e.g., the US automobile
industry), and then determine which level of each definition is satisfied in that sample.
Regardless of whether researchers select the definitions first and the sample second or vice
versa, it is crucial that the definitions used when developing hypotheses are identical to those used
when operationalizing the constructs. It is likely that hypotheses generated using strong definitions
will not be supported if the operationalizations of the constructs only satisfy the weak definitions
(e.g., defining strategic groups based only on firm size). Similarly, hypotheses based on strong
definitions probably will not be supported if a preselected sample only satisfy the weak definitions
(regardless of the measures used).
Empirical Studies Linking the Constructs
In the preceding section, it is argued that cognitive communities, strategic groups, and
networks of interacting firms are related constructs. However, at this point, they are related by
definition only. Researchers (e.g., P. Grinyer, personal communication, November, 1991) have
rightly questioned the existence of such constructs. Are they meaningful? Are they reasonable
descriptions of the way practitioners think and behave, or are they merely reflect statistical
artifacts?
One approach to answering these questions is to examine the construct validity (Cook and
Campbell, 1979) of these collectives. Empirical findings based on any one method in isolation
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may be suspect; the degree of bias is unclear. Here, three constructs are assessed using different
methods and different types of data. The biases associated with these methods are expected to be
fairly unique. If the predicted pattern of relationships between the constructs is observed in spite
of these biases, then it would be less plausible that the observed relationships between the three
constructs are merely due to methodological artifacts. Support would be gained for the assumption
that the constructs exist and are related as described.
Thomas, Porac, and colleagues have conducted a series of studies of collectives in a variety
of industries. These include a highly turbulent emergent industry (the computer software
industry), a mature industry that is undergoing very gradual changes (the retail grocery industry),
and a mature industry that has become extremely stable over time (the Scottish knitwear industry).
The three industries provide an ordered set for study. The software industry marks one extreme as
it is continuously changing. The knitwear industry marks the opposite extreme as it has changed
very little over the years. The grocery retail falls somewhere between those extremes.
US Software Industry
The software industry was selected to examine the nature of cognitive communities under
conditions of extreme ambiguity. There are a large number of partially overlapping, yet diverse
niches. Hence, there is considerable ambiguity regarding which set of forces impinging on the
firm are most critical. Further, rapid technologic change creates considerable ambiguity regarding
changes over time.
In a study of twenty software-development start-ups, cognitive orientations and pervasive
social networking were found to be cntical in the start-up process (Levenhagen and Thomas,
1990). Due to the continuous changes in this industry, there is little chance of any particular
perspective being repeated often enough to establish and spread as a shared industry recipe.
"Entrepreneurs in those markets seem intent on creating rules to new competitive games by
intuitively trying to create new product categories, new kinds of firms, and growth markets"
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(Thomas and Porac, 1991). The only shared beliefs reflected (a) the awareness of ambiguity and
(b) the perception that the ambiguity represents an opportunity.
Levenhagen's current research for his dissertation examines the degree of consensus
throughout the value chain with respect to desirable product characteristics. Preliminary results
across firms that are vertically related in the value chain (i.e., suppliers and buyers) are consistent
with previous findings across horizontally related firms (i.e., rivals): there is little consensus on
what the ideal software package in a particular niche should be like.
UK Grocery Retail Industry
The grocery retail industry is much more stable than the software industry. In a pilot study
used to assess similarities and differences in views, six to ten managers were interviewed from
each of three organizations representing a range of supermarket retail operations. Results revealed
that cognitive taxonomies of firms in the industry vaned widely from firm to firm. Further,
differences were found across managers within the firms. It was suggested that the taxonomies
were richer in areas that the given manager was most familiar with. This familiarity effect was
evidenced by more taxonomic levels, more categories at any given level, and richer lists of
attributes associated with each category.
When managers make sense of a market, the resulting cognitive structures retlect the
elements that the manager encounters most often and is most familiar with. While this certainly
reflects a cognitive bias, the underlying cognitive heunstic seems relatively pragmatic- Cognitive
structures are developed to fit the managers personal needs in terms of decision-making and
problem solving.
Two subsequent studies have been performed to compare a cognitive approach with a more
conventional approach to industry and competitive analysis (e.g.. Porter, 1980; McGee and
"Presumably, a nonbiased structuring would reflect the industry in its entirety with uniform richness tliroughout, but
this assimies that industries are clearly bounded. This is arguably not the case as most industries are better described
as fuzzy sets than as discrete units (Porter, 1980).
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Thomas, 1986). In the economics oriented study, Lewis and Thomas (1990) and Carroll, Lewis,
and Thomas (forthcoming, April, 1992) adopted a strategic groups approach to identify the group
structure in the industry and the competitive recipes that defined the groups. Annual data reflecting
scale and scope dimensions of strategic choice were obtained from the largest 16 multiples (chains)
over a seven year period.
In the cognition oriented study, questionnaires were administered to a large number of
managers within two retail operations: a large multiple (chain) and a large coop.^ Questionnaires
assessed each manager's views about career issues, who they viewed as competitors, the attributes
of those competitors, and the competitive structure of the industry.
The results from the cognitive data were similar to those from the economic analyses with
respect to the key strategic dimensions. Multi-dimensional scaling of the cognitive data indicated
that there were three key dimensions in this industry: store size, geographic coverage, and
price/proportion of own-label lines. These dimensions reflect the economies of scale and scope
noted in the economic analysis of the industry.
In addition to identifying key strategic dimensions, the results of the multi -dimensional
scaling procedure were used to plot the firms in the cognitive representation of the strategic space.
This plot was compared to the strategic groups identified using a cluster analysis on the economics
oriented data set. While the groupings from the two methods were not identical, many of the firms
were consistently grouped together.
Scottish Knitwear Industry
A third set of studies was conducted on the Scottish knitwear industry which exemplifies
stability . "This particular group of firms was thought to be an ideal case for studying the intluence
of shared beliefs and competitive recipes given its small size, cultural homogeneity, geographical
characteristics, and long-standing traditions" (Thomas and Porac, 1991).
^The identity of these firms are withheld to honor a guarantee of confidentiality.
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A pilot study (Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller, 1989) with top managers from
approximately 20 firms replicated findings from the grocery retail study. The nchness of
taxonomies reflected a given manager's demands for cognitive processing, and competitors were
firms in the same taxonomic level as the manager's firm. Notably, these managers only listed
other Scottish firms as their rivals; Italian producers were perceived as being in different
businesses.
In a larger study, questionnaires were sent to 260 firms; 89 usable questionnaires were
returned. A cluster analysis was performed on 75 strategic variables reflecting each firm's choices
regarding raw materials, production methods, distnbution channels, and end consumer. Thus, the
resulting strategic groups were based on inputs, throughputs, and outputs.
If firms are geographically close together and have similar inputs, throughputs, and
outputs, then the firms will probably compete for suppliers, workers, equipment, buyers, etc.
Network analysis revealed that the densities of both cooperative and competitive ties were higher
within the groups than between them. That is, firms are more likely to be perceived as rivals
and/or allies if they are in the same economically based strategic group than if the are in different
groups. The differences in the density of interactions within groups versus between groups are
very consistent in this sample. When network analysis used the patterns of comp)etition and
cooperation to predict which strategic group a firm was in, the UCINET package was 100%
accurate in placing firms into the strategic groups that had been identified using cluster analysis.
In comparing lists of rivals and allies provided by the managers, it was found that the sets
were not mutually exclusive. In fact, the overlap was fairly strong (r = +.32). This suggests that
cooperative and competitive interactions are not diametrically opposed. They may be better thought
of as tools in a repertoire of behaviors that firms use to manage economic interdependence.
To determine if the members of each group had a shared sense of identity, each manager
was asked to rate a number of terms to indicate which terms best describe his firm. A MANOVA
was performed using strategic group membership as the independent variable and descriptiveness
ratings as the dependent variables. The significant results indicated that there was greater variance
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between strategic groups than within them in terms of how managers label their firms. Shiffee
tests suggested that these differences followed fairly simple patterns retlectrng relatively discrete
categories. This suggests that the members of these strategic groups have some consensus on the
type of firms they are.
Findings suggest that managers do perceive distinct groups of interdependent, interacting
firms in the Scottish knitwear industry. Different groups use slight variations on a common recipe.
Still, an industry recipe seems to exist within the greater cognitive community (Scottish knitwear
producers). The strategic groups are part of the same superordinate category (i.e., Scottish
knitwear) while other producers (e.g., Beneton) fall into other categories (e.g., Italian knitwear) at
that superordinate level.
As noted earlier in this section, the similarity in this shared set of beliefs at the strategic
group level, and to a lesser extent at the industry level, is probably due to the small size, cultural
homogeneity, geographical characteristics, and long-standing traditions. The remarkable stability
in this industry may be due to the fact that it has been virtually a closed system. There have been
vary few avenues through which novel ideas could enter, and the established equilibrium
throughout the value chain has been robust and highly resistant to change.
Interpretation of Empirical Findings
Given that the theories from the three streams of research address incompatible levels of
analysis, make contradictory assumptions, etc., it is difficult to use deductive logic to integrate the
theoretical propositions from various perspectives. Alternatively, inductive logic could then be
applied to empirical findings (data) to gain insights into the relationships between the different
perspectives . The goal would be to integrate the perspectives by extending existing theones or to
develop a theoretical framework that subsumes existing theories by addressing the union of the
phenomena studied from the three perspectives (Feyerabend, 1970).
Here, the empirical findings reveal convergence across the cognitive, organizational, and
economic approaches in the two stable industries. Given that the constructs were operationalized
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using different methods and different types of data, it is unlikely that the results were due to
statistical artifacts or other extraneous factors. This lends credibility to the theoretical argument that
these constructs do exist and may overlap to a large degree.
However, the definition of a cognitive community was not be satisfied in the software
industry even though firms were interacting as rivals or as buyers/suppliers. There are several
possible causes. It is conceivable that the measure of cognitive similanty was a poor
operationalization for the construct. This explanation does not seem plausible as the method
replicated that used in a number of the studies the other two industnes.
A more plausible explanation is that the relationships among the economic, psychological,
organizational factors may be moderated by some other factor(s). For example, the degree of
ambiguity in an industry could influence the accuracy of managenal perceptions. In ambiguous,
rapidly changing environments, the initial (mis)perceptions of managers drive subsequent social
enactment processes. In the absence of industry-wide consensus, many socially constructed
networks have little systematic impact on the structure of the industry while a select few may cause
Schumpeterian revolutions. In such a revolution, the economic reality should come in line with the
perceptions of members of the innovating cognitive community (i.e., those enacting their shared
vision). Consequently, there should be close agreement between economic, cognitive, and
organizational measures within that particular cognitive community. For the rest of the industry,
however, there would be increased discrepancies between perceptions and economic realities.
Generally, it will take some time for the victims of the Schumpeterian shock to recognize the
change and interpret it, let alone respond to it.
In a relatively stable environment (the grocery retail industry) there is a greater
correspondence among economic, cognitive, and organizational factors. However, the
discrepancies do exist. In an extremely stable, narrowly defined industry (the Scottish knitwear
industry), the degree of correspondence between economic, cognitive, and organizational factors is
remarkably high, and for some comparisons, it is perfect. The moderating factor which weakens
the causal relationships (i.e., ambiguity) is not prominent in this industry.
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Intuitively, it seems as though managers try to be economically rational when making
decisions about interactions with buyers, suppliers, rivals, etc. As these interactions define
Porter's (1980) five forces, changes in the patterns of interactions can alter the structure of the
industry. Managers should try to anticipate changes in patterns of interactions (industry dynamics)
and incorporate these expectations in developing competitive strategy. Figure 1 sketches the loose
coupling of these streams of research. If industry structure is undergoing rapid change and/or if
there is ambiguity about economic forces operating in a particular niche, then there will be slippage
in the causal links due, in large part, to misperceptions of managers.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Developing an Integrative Theoretical Framework
The stream of research described in the previous section examines collectives within
industries from several perspectives and reveals a considerable amount of overlap. Cognitive
communities, strategic groups, and networks of interacting firms do seem to be related, and the
relationship is influenced by the degree of ambiguity in the industry.
Within this context. Porter's ( 1980) Competitive Strategy may serve as a useful platform
for building an integrative theoretical framework: it is simple, well known, and incorporates
elements from economics, psychology, and OB. A broad cycle of reciprocal causation is proposed
in which economic factors (e.g., industry structure) influence psychological factors (e.g.,
perceptions of economic incentives), which subsequently influence organizational factors (e.g., the
social enactment of markets), which in turn influence economic factors (e.g., industry structure),
and so on.
Porter's approach is based on the premise that formulating effective strategy requires
(a) industry analyses and (b) competitor analyses. That is, strategist should (a) identify firms that
might influence profitability and (b) predict what those firms will do.
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Porter argues that the boundaries and the structure of a firm's industry depend on the
organizations that are most Hkeiy to affect that firm's profitability. Hence, the approach is based
on networks of economically interdependent firms. This is the essence of Porter's five forces
model. Vertical relationships (i.e., with buyers and suppliers) form networks of transactions that
run through the value chain. As firms compete for transactions with buyers and/or suppliers,
networks of horizontal relationships emerge among rivals, producers of substitutes, and potential
entrants.
After determining who is interacting in this grand network, it is necessary to predict how
they will interact. A series of competitor analyses must be performed to generate competitor
response profiles (i.e., the likely responses to a given event). Predictmg the actions of firms in
extended rivalry is nontrivial. In the value chain, both vertical (supplier, buyer) and horizontal
(rival, potential entrant, producers of substitutes) related firms mutually influence each other's
profitability. These relationships can be charactenzed as mixed motive games similar to the
prisoners' dilemma game: there are conflicting incentives to cooperate and compete. This causes
uncertainty when predicting the behaviors of firms.
To reduce the uncertainty. Porter recommends generating response profiles based on,
among other things, the goals and assumptions of managers at various levels of each firm. Porter
recognizes that these managers may not agree with each other, but he does not suggest how to
combine conflicting perspectives to determine the intended strategy the firm as a whole will follow.
It is argued that interactions among firms will follow economic rationality to the extent that
its participants can perceive "economic realities." Some findings in group problem solving in
social psychology literature (e.g., Laughlin, 1980, McGrath, 1984) become relevant here. As the
ambiguity and complexity of a problem increases, it becomes much harder to convince others to
accept a given solution. Two sources of ambiguity are expected to decision processes in business:
(a) ambiguity over which subset of forces is operating within a niche at a given time and (b)
ambiguity due to changes in those factors over time.
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If an economically rational solution can be found and it is fairly obvious to all participants,
then the network is likely to enact that pattern of transactions. As the problem becomes more
ambiguous, economic rationality will play less of a role and charismatic leadership and the selling
of visions will become more important. Also, as ambiguity increases, larger proportions of the
network will have to be firmly committed before the entire network will accept the new pattern and
enact it with material transactions.
One way to think of this is to decompose risk of a venture into two parts that are inversely
related to (a) the probability of getting all the necessary participants to cooperate and (b) the
conditional probability that the venture would be profitable given that all the participants cooperate.
Convincing potential participants that all the other elements of the network are taken care of is
usually a critical aspect of selling a vision. As more parties give firm commitments to participate,
the entrepreneur's vision generally gains more "credibility" or "legitimacy," and it becomes easier
to convince remaining parties to jump on the bandwagon.^
While it is possible and often useful to consider a separate networks for each force or for
particular segments of the value chain, the networks of firms associated with the five forces are
inherently woven together in a system that encompasses the entire value chain. Firms are
enmeshed in a complex web of interdependence. Disturbing one strand (i.e., a link between two
firms) may send ripples throughout the entire web.
In the context of this analysis, how do industnes change? They do not
change in a piecemeal fashion, because an industry is an interrelated system.
Change in one element of an industry's structure tends to tngger changes in other
areas. For example, an innovation in marketing might develop a new buyer
segment, but serving this new segment may trigger changes in manufactunng
methods, thereby increasing economies o( scale. The firms reaping these
economies first will also be in position to start backward integration, which will
affect power with suppliers—and so on. One industry change, therefore, often sets
off a chain reaction leading to many other changes. (Porter, 1980, p. 184)
'^Interestingly, many of the innovations that have made it (i.e., developed sustainable markets) were not the best
technology in the short-run (Arthur, 1989) or the long-run (Agnew, 1981; Cowan, 1987; David, 1985). Clearly,
choices made in forming new ventures and new markets are inlluenced by factors other than formal -evaluation
processes (Burbelman, 1983; Bower, 1970; Howell and Higgins, 1990; Kanter, 1983; Schon, 1963).
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In the first wave of the competitor analysis, response profiles are generated for the
extended rivals (i.e., buyers, suppliers, rivals, potential entrants, producers of substitutes). This
would yield a preliminary industry forecast for strategy formulation. A SWOT analysis is
performed in relation to the industry forecast. Then, a series of possible strategic moves is
generated.
In an informal game theory style, this initial set of possible moves is used as input for a
second iteration. Results from the second iteration would be used as input for the third, and so on.
The strategy with the greatest predicted long-run payoff (given the likely responses of extended
rivals) would be implemented.
Porter (1980) designed the book to aid practitioners in making more economically rational
decisions. While the primary emphasis is on the content of the decision process, Porter alludes to
a number of process issues as well (e.g., bounded rationality of managers, the impact of emotions
on cognitive processes, political conflicts within organizations).
For example. Porter (1980, p. 234) notes that this approach to strategy formulation is
problematic in that the computational demands of the forecasting method exceed the bounds of
human cognition. Porter suggests using scenarios as tools for cognitive simplification. This
allows the manager to consider higher level patterns of interactions among interdependent firms
(e.g., the breakout of cut-throat competition in oligopolies, convergence on focal points).
Along with process issues within a single individual. Porter raises interpersonal or
social/organizational process issues. For example, if the problem is divided among members of an
industry analysis team. Porter notes that there may be problems in communicating and integrating
information across analysts. In group problem solving terms, there tends to be significant
"process loss" (McGrath, 1984). Further, analysts from different departments within a given firm
may be operating on very different agendas.
Agency problems exist to the extent that managers' perceptions of personal utility of
alternatives actions do not parallel the utility for the firm as a whole. Each manager acts
opportunistically to obtain the best personal outcomes knowing that the other firms may respond.
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However, other members of the managers' firm may use the reactions of other firms as
information in subsequent cognitive and pohtical processes. If a manager makes decisions that
result in lower payoffs for others within the firm, that manager will lose credibility and power.
New coalitions may form as the other managers attempt to protect their own interests.
Summary of Framework
Porter argues that to make economically rational decisions, it is necessary to consider the
cognitive processes within each decision makers and the political processes among those
individuals. This juxtaposition of content issues (from economics) and process issues (from
psychology and OB) provides a powerful framework for research in strategic management.
Content models can then be used to suggest economically rational patterns of transactions with
buyers and suppliers as well as interactions among rivals, producers of substitutes, etc. This
intendedly rational perspective is then ennched by the recognition that both cognitive and political
processes can distort the decisions in complex ways. The empirical findings discussed in the
previous section suggest that such distortions are most likely to occur in highly ambiguous
environments. Process models may be useful in predicting when and how a firm's actions will
deviate from economic rationality. If the models can predict such deviations, they could improve
the accuracy of competitor response profiles. These, in turn, could improve the accuracy of the
scenario analyses and the effectiveness of strategy formulation based on those scenarios.
Ultimately, this could mean improved performance for the firm.
Porter (1980) notes that a critical problem in attempting to perform a comprehensive
industry analysis is that the computational demands exceed the bounds of human cognition. One
possible solution to this problem is to use of analytic models on high speed computers to extend
the boundaries of rationality with respect to processing speed and memory capacity. Current
research includes efforts to develop a mathematical model and an artificial intelligence model
(Carroll, 1991). Both of these models have been designed to approximate economically rational
decisions. However, the models attempt to simulate distortions in assumptions and goals due to
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cognitive biases and the effects of emotional reactions. These cognitive models have also been
designed to predispose individuals to various forms of political activities within the firm (e.g.,
coalition formation, political infighting).
Summary
The main thrust of the stream of research outlined in this paper is that managers may be
intendedly rational in the process of developing competitive strategy. However, the process is
influenced by cognitive and socio-political forces as managers interact within and between firms.
This has implications for patterns of cooperative and competitive interactions among firms and,
more broadly, for industry dynamics.
The proposed theoretical framework and models represent an attempt to integrate insights
from economics, OB, and psychology. These are based on partially overlapping patterns of data
obtained in a series of interdisciplinary studies of collectives within industries. The convergence
and divergence of the findings were used to drive the integration of these perspectives. The
resulting models use an open systems onentation to predict phenomena at several units of analysis
simultaneously. The models are intended to ultimately predict industry dynamics, although a
thorough test of this aspect of the models may be deferred to subsequent studies.
Future research in this stream will be directed toward improving the predictive accuracy of
these and subsequent models for use in academic research. To make the models useful for
practitioners, heuristics will be developed for cases in which information about rivals is sparse.
Concluding Remarks
Theories from a number of disciplines (e.g., economics, OB, psychology) have been used
to understand phenomena in strategic management research. Each perspective provides a unique
set of insights, but there has been relatively little success in putting the pieces of the puzzle
together.
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Firms often deviate from economically rational courses of action even when the economic
incentives are relatively obvious. While it is often noted that psychological and socio-political
forces probably combined to cause that deviation, there are few if any attempts to formalize how
those factors combine. The details of the interactions must be clearly specified in order to predict
when and how firms will deviate from economically rational behaviors.
Similarly, it is unclear how psychological and socio-political forces influence firms when
economic rationality does not dictate an obvious course of action. Integrating these factors would
make a major contribution to understanding strategic actions in emergent markets where industry
boundaries and structure are ambiguous. It could also further research in oligopolies where firms
are typically faced with conflicting incentives to cooperate and compete.
It is unlikely that interdisciplinary theories will be developed in relatively more focussed
fields. Interdisciplinary research should be one of the primary distinctive competences of strategic
management as a field, and there seems to be sufficient demand for interdisciplinary research
within this field to make such ventures profitable. Further, it is reasonable to assume that
neighboring fields (e.g., I/O economics, OB, social and industrial psychology) would be interested
in importing interdisciplinary theories. This development could allow strategic management to
begin balancing the exchange of theory that has been virtually a one-way street since the inception
of the field of strategic management. This would certainly go far in improving the credibility of
strategic management as a science.
The potential value-added by strategic management can be put into business terms by
conceptualizing technologies as knowledge structures (XXX GET CITE FROM HOWARD XXX,
19XX). Licensing technologies reduces start-up costs (e.g., R&D expenditures) for the receiving
organization. These technologies can be applied directly or combined with other technologies in
novel ways within the receiving organization as they develop their own innovations. In an
academic environment, exporting interdisciplinary theones to traditionally more focussed fields
should allow their researchers to push back the boundaries of those narrowly defined fields with
substantially less effort; the technology (knowledge structures) for linking their known body of
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theories to a wealth of theories in other disciplines could be provided by strategic management
researchers. For an entrepreneurial perspective, this represents a remarkable opportunity for
strategic management as a field.
Another way of approaching this issue is to compare the development of a scientific fields
to the economic development of nations. Strategic management as a field may wish to model its
development after the economic development of Japan. That nation initially imported technologies
and merely applied them at low cost. The meteoric rise of Japan as an economic power began
when the imported technologies were combined and the resulting synergies represented significant
additions within the value chain.
The initial criticism of the Japanese firms was that they could only copy other technologies.
They could not innovate by themselves. Similarly, strategic management has been labelled as an
applied field. There is a widely held belief that this field is not capable of, and should not be held
responsible for, making significant contributions to theory development. Passing on this bias is
perhaps the greatest disservice educators within the field could do to their doctoral students.
First, in a practitioner-oriented field such as strategic management, development of
integrative theories could provide a more holistic view of firms and industries. More to the point,
it could improve techniques for forecasting industry dynamics, thereby improving the effectiveness
of practitioners in developing competitive strategies. The contnbution to practitioners would
ironically be hampered by fostering the belief that strategic management should focus on applying
theories, rather than developing them.
Second, in addition to this internal damage to the field, spreading such beliefs predisposes
future generations of researchers to continue in the tradition of a staggering trade-deficit for
theories. This may fuel serious doubts about the legitimacy of strategic management as a science.
The opportunity for theory development clearly exists. It is hoped that the field will not turn its
back to the future by clinging to the ways of the past.
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Figure 1. Venn Diagram Reflecting Overlapping Sets of Firms that Would be Encompassed





















Figure 2. Sketch of the Cyclical Patterns of Causal Links Between Various Cognitive,
Organizational, and Economic Factors.



